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Abstract 
Not only does economic theory predict high-risk individuals to be more likely to purchase insurance, but 
insurance coverage is also thought to crowd out precautionary activities. In spite of stark theoretical 
predictions, there is conflicting empirical evidence on adverse selection, and evidence on ex ante moral 
hazard is very scarce. Using data from the Seguro Popular Experiment in Mexico, this paper documents 
patterns of selection on observables into health insurance as well as the existence of non-negligible ex 
ante moral hazard. More specifically, the findings indicate that (i) agents in poor self-assessed health prior 
to the intervention have, all else equal, a higher propensity to take up insurance; and (ii) insurance 
coverage reduces the demand for self-protection in the form of preventive care. Curiously, however, 
individuals do not sort based on objective measures of their health. 
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I. Introduction 
Starting with the seminal work of Arrow (1963), economists have long been aware of the possibility of 
market failure due to asymmetric information. Standard explanations for why the First Welfare Theorem 
may not hold rely on adverse selection (Akerlof 1970, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976) as well as ex ante 
and ex post moral hazard (Ehrlich and Becker 1972, Pauly 1968, 1974). 
In the context of insurance markets, these models postulate a positive correlation between coverage 
and risk occurrence (Chiappori and Salanié 2000, Chiappori et al. 2006).1 Yet, empirical tests of this 
prediction point often in conflicting directions. Cawley and Philipson (1999), for instance, find little or no 
information asymmetries in the market for life insurance, whereas Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) 
conclude the opposite with respect to that for annuities.2 
However, even if ‘high risk’ agents are, ceteris paribus, more likely to purchase insurance than their 
low risk counterparts, insurance status and ex post risk occurrence need not be correlated when 
individuals possess multidimensional private information (de Meza and Webb 2001); and a positive 
correlation alone is uninformative about whether market failures are due to adverse selection or moral 
hazard. But exactly this distinction is important for public policy. Consider, for example, the case of 
insurance mandates—as implemented in many European countries. While mandates are often welfare 
enhancing when inefficiencies are due to selection, it is well known that requiring coverage may actually 
decrease welfare in the presence of moral hazard. 
Using data from a large-scale randomized field experiment in Mexico, this paper makes two 
contributions to the literature. First, it exploits rich information on agents’ health prior to the intervention 
coupled with experimental variation in access to health insurance in order to analyze sorting based on risk, 
thereby disentangling moral hazard from selection. Second, the paper explicitly tests for ex ante moral 
hazard.3 
In 2004 the Mexican government introduced the System for Social Protection in Health (Sistema de 
Protección Social en Salud, SPSS). This reform sought to protect workers outside the formal sector from 
catastrophic health expenditures through the introduction of Seguro Popular en Salud (SP). By the letter 
of the law SP constitutes a wealth transfer program and was not explicitly designed as an insurance 
scheme. Economically, however, it serves the function of a voluntary health insurance option available to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the insurance setting adverse select refers to the idea that ‘high risk’ individuals are more likely to buy insurance, or 
purchase more coverage than ‘low risk’ ones. Ex ante moral hazard is said to exist when the insured invest less effort in 
self-protection than their uninsured counterparts; and ex post moral hazard captures agents’ failure to fully internalize the 
cost of covered services. 
2 For a useful review of the empirical literature see Chiappori and Salanié (2003). 
3 Unfortunately, the data only contain information on out-of-pocket (as opposed to total) medical expenditures, and do not 
lend themselves to a test of ex post moral hazard. See Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) for a survey of earlier, non-
experimental attempts to infer adverse selection from the correlation between insurance status and individual 
characteristics proxying for risk. 
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the uninsured and their dependents, who in 2004 comprised about half of the Mexican population. That is, 
to obtain full coverage for a large number of health interventions and pharmaceuticals families must 
formally affiliate with SP and those in upper four quintiles of the income distribution pay a small, 
progressive income based fee. 
Due to administrative and budgetary constraints SP has been rolled out in different stages over a 
multi-year horizon. Commissioned by the government to evaluate SP, King et al. (2007, 2009a) use the 
staged rollout to experimentally introduce geographic variation in the availability of health insurance for 
the poor. They report that within 10 months after random assignment SP reduced catastrophic out-of-
pocket health expenditures by 6.5 percentage points, but did not increase the utilization of medical care 
(King et al. 2009a). All data used in this paper stem from their intervention. Since the Seguro Popular 
Experiment induced a large number of individuals to obtain insurance coverage and collected information 
on the utilization of preventive care as well as on agents’ health prior to treatment, it is exceptionally well 
suited for studying selection and ex ante moral hazard.4 
As predicted by theory, the results show that ‘high risk’ agents are, ceteris paribus, more likely to 
opt into SP—although the insured are not more ‘risky’ on average. That is, despite the absence of a 
positive raw correlation between agents’ insurance status and proxies of risk, this paper presents evidence 
of the systematic selection predicted by theory. In particular, individuals who rated their health as “bad or 
very bad” before SP became available are 6.9 percentage points more likely to sign up for SP than those 
in “good or very good” health (compared to an overall treatment effect of 29 percentage points). 
Curiously, however, agents in the experiment sort only on pre-period medical expenditures and subjective 
well-being. There appears to be no selection on objective measures of health—possibly because 
individuals are less aware of the latter. 
Relying on individuals’ utilization of preventive medical care as a proxy for self-protection, this 
paper also demonstrates the existence of considerable ex ante moral hazard. Although the full-cost of 
preventive care decline with insurance coverage, the effect of SP on the utilization of these services is 
negative and non-trivial in size. Given the positive price effect, such a decline is likely due to ex ante 
moral hazard. 
The results presented in this paper speak directly to those in the recent literature. Finkelstein and 
McGarry (2006) present evidence of offsetting multidimensional private information in the market for 
long-term care insurance; and Fang et al. (2008) show that the insured in the Medigap market spend less 
on health care, which the authors attribute to neutralizing advantageous selection on education and 
cognitive ability. The present paper identifies risk based sorting from experimental variation, but does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 King et al. (2009a) do not test for selection on observable risk factors and do not relate the use of preventive care to ex 
ante moral hazard. 
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find advantageous selection on education. Notwithstanding a positive raw correlation between education 
and insurance status, the causal effect of education on insurance take up goes in the opposite direction—at 
least in this very specific setting. Unfortunately, the data do not point to other dimensions of private 
information that would explain why individuals do not appear to be negatively selected on average. 
Although insurance coverage had long been predicted to crowd out precautionary effort (cf. Ehrlich 
and Becker 1972, Pauly 1974), empirical evidence on ex ante moral hazard has hitherto been very sparse. 
For the health insurance market Zweifel and Manning (2000) review a number of studies estimating the 
price elasticity of preventive care. They conclude that “the limited available evidence indicates that the 
demand for preventive care is a declining function of out-of-pocket money price” (p. 420), but that it is 
unclear whether or not it is more elastic than that for regular ambulatory care.5 Evidence on the extensive 
margin is even scarcer. The findings in Card et el. (2008) suggest no reduction in the demand for 
preventive services due to Medicare coverage, but Klick and Stratman (2007) argue that health insurance 
coverage is associated with increases in BMI.6 
Taken at face value the results of this paper have potentially important policy implications. If ex ante 
moral hazard is indeed a non-trivial force in the market for health insurance, then the welfare 
consequences of insurance mandates are theoretically ambiguous—even if agents are strongly adversely 
selected and if preferences were homogenous. Moreover, optimal insurance contracts would not only 
trade off risk sharing and ex post moral hazard through co-payments (Zeckhauser 1970), but would also 
have to provide appropriate incentives to engage in precautionary activities. But as self-protection 
resembles the classic multi-task principal-agent problem (Holmström and Milgrom 1991), it is a priori 
unclear what the optimal incentive scheme might look like. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background information on the 
health care sector in Mexico as well as on the experiment conducted by King et al. (2007, 2009a). Section 
III presents the empirical results, and the last section concludes.7  
 
II. Background Information and Data Description 
A. Institutional Background 
The Mexican health care system is characterized by several vertically integrated social security 
institutions (e.g., IMSS, IMSSTE, PEMEX, SEDENA, etc.).8 They provide health insurance and medical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For estimates from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment see Lillard et al. (1986) and Newhouse et al. (1993). 
6 In other markets the evidence on ex ante moral hazard has been ambivalent as well. See, for instance, see Abbring et al. 
(2003) or Abbring et al. (2008). 
7 There are three appendices. Appendix A contains a formal proof omitted from the body of the paper, and Appendix B 
discusses selection on education and pre-period medical expenditures. A Data Appendix with the precise definitions and 
sources of all variables used in the analysis is provided on the author’s website. 
8 The following summary draws heavily on the description in OECD (2005). 
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care to workers in the formal sector of the economy as well as to their dependents. Generally, facilities 
run by a social security provider offer free treatment to any of its affiliates; and membership in these 
institutions is mandatory for all salaried workers. However, given the size of the informal sector, only 
about 50% of the Mexican population is covered by the social security system. The other half remains 
without health insurance (OECD 2005).9 
The uninsured purchase medical care either in a large, unregulated private market or in (often 
inadequately funded) public clinics and hospitals. Although clinics operated by the Ministry of Health or 
State Health Services offer medical care at below full-cost prices, private out-of-pocket payments account 
for c. 55% of all health related spending in Mexico (OECD 2005). Consequently, catastrophic health 
expenditures and poverty go often hand in hand. 
In January 2004 the Mexican government introduced the System for Social Protection in Health 
(Sistema de Protección Social en Salud, SPSS). Over a multi-year horizon this reform aims at eliminating 
catastrophic health expenditures for workers outside the formal sector, and at improving public health 
care provision by injecting new resources into the system as well as re-balancing existing transfers from 
the federal government to the states. Ultimately, SPSS is projected to increase public spending on health 
care by .8–1.0 percentage points of GDP—roughly 30% of the 2002 level (OECD 2005).10 
At the heart of the reform is Seguro Popular en Salud (SP). It is important to recognize that formally 
SP was intended to be wealth transfer program, not an insurance scheme. That is, premiums are not risk 
adjusted, and are not set to break even. Nevertheless, economically SP resembles a voluntary health 
insurance option available to all uninsured and their dependents, irrespective of pre-existing conditions. In 
order to obtain coverage for over 250 health interventions and more than 300 pharmaceuticals (without 
any co-pay) families must formally affiliate with SP and pay a small, progressive income based fee.11 
Poor households, i.e. those in the lowest quintile of the income distribution, are exempt from paying 
premiums. The same is true for participants in the Oportunidades anti-poverty program, who are 
automatically enrolled in SP by the states.12 
By the letter of the law every citizen who is not covered by the social security system is allowed to 
enroll in SP. However, financial and administrative constraints require the program to be rolled out in 
multiple stages, and only to areas whose health facilities meet a set of minimal requirements. At least in 
theory, individuals living in regions in which SP has not yet been introduced can travel to the nearest 
receiving area in order to affiliate. Yet, the benefits of doing so may be rather small in practice, as sick 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Only 3% of individuals buy private insurance, many of whom are already affiliated with a social security provider 
(OECD 2005). 
10 See, for instance, Frenk et al. (2006) for details on SPSS; or Homedes and Ugalde (2009) for a history of health reform 
in Mexico. 
11 The services covered by SP treat illnesses accountable for 95% of the disease burden in Mexico (King et al. 2007). 
12 In the data 93.6% of SP affiliates report paying no premium. 
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individuals would have to go back to take advantage of the free treatment to which their SP affiliation 
entitles them. It is, therefore, useful to think of the staged introduction of SP as introducing geographic 
variability in poor families’ access to affordable health insurance. 
Several observational studies evaluate SP’s success in reducing out-of-pocket expenditures and 
improving access to medical care, generally finding positive effects (e.g., Barros 2008, Bleich et al. 2007, 
Gakidou et al. 2006, Knox 2008, and Sosa-Rubi et al. 2009). However, King et al. (2007) report that 
political considerations played an important role in determining which regions received SP first, thereby 
raising concerns about identifications strategies based on non-experimental variation. 
 
B. Data Description 
To assess the effectiveness of SP the Mexican Ministry of Health commissioned a large-scale randomized 
field experiment implemented and analyzed by King et al. (2007, 2009a, 2009b). They exploit the staged 
rollout to experimentally introduce geographic variation in the availability of SP. All data used in this 
paper stem from their program evaluation.13 
In a first step King and coauthors partitioned Mexico into 12,284 “health clusters”, defined as the 
catchment area around an existing or planned health clinic. As 19 of 32 states refused to take part in the 
evaluation, a subset of 7,078 (5,439 rural and 1,639 urban) clusters remained ultimately eligible for 
possible participation in the experiment.14 To assure that the treatment and control group are balanced on 
observables, eligible health clusters were matched into pairs. Based on closeness of match and likelihood 
of compliance a subset of 74 pairs was selected to participate; and assignment to the treatment or control 
group was based on the flip of a fair coin within each pair. Figure 1 shows the location of treatment and 
control clusters. 
Concurrent with random assignment (August – September 2005) two baseline surveys collected data 
on households and health facilities. Besides standard demographic variables and information on the 
utilization of medical care, the household questionnaire also elicited out-of-pocket expenditures and self-
assessed health prior to the intervention. In addition, the data also contain objective measures of 
individuals’ health from anthropomorphic tests administered on site, e.g., BMI, cholesterol level, or 
systolic blood pressure. 
Unfortunately, budget constraints limited the number of clusters in which the household survey 
could be conducted to 50 pairs. Consequently, the analysis in this paper only uses data on the 32,426 
respondents to the household survey with non-missing information on insurance status. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The following description of the experiment borrows heavily from King et al. (2007, 2009a). For additional details the 
interested readers should consult the aforementioned studies. 
14 Clusters in which a substantial fraction of families had already been affiliated with SP had been discarded. 
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Table 1 displays summary statistics from the baseline survey.15 Obviously, individuals in the Seguro 
Popular Experiment are not a random sample of Mexicans. Given that the experiment intentionally 
focused on rural areas with low insurance coverage, it is not surprising that only 10.6% of participants are 
urban dwellers, and a mere 21.8% have any health insurance at baseline. Comparing individuals in the 
Seguro Popular Experiment to the nationally representative sample of the ENSANut 2005 (Encuesta 
Nacional de Salud y Nutrición), King et al. (2007) report that the demographics of both populations look 
otherwise very similar.  
More importantly, on almost all observable characteristics the treatment and control group appear 
roughly balanced. Yet, there are two important exceptions. Individuals in the treatment group are more 
likely than those in the control group to have had a mammogram in the pre-period (! = .04) and are more 
frequently already covered by insurance (! = .05). Although true random assignment does not seem 
implausible (with 2 out of the 33 displayed pairwise comparisons being statistically at the 5% level), the 
summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that it might nevertheless be important to account for chance 
differences at baseline. To this end Section IV.C performs a series of robustness checks finding little 
indication that the results reported in this paper are driven by such differences. 
Actual treatment consisted in a local media campaign to inform families about the benefits of SP and 
to encourage them to enroll, as well as in setting up a ‘service and orientation stand’ (Módulo de Atención 
y Orientación) in each treatment cluster so citizens could formally affiliate with SP. Moreover, states 
attempted to improve health facilities, the availability of drugs, and to hire additional medical personnel. 
King et al. (2009a), however, argue that, while the no-charge policy became effective immediately 
after affiliation, the assessment period of 10 months was likely too short for states’ efforts to enhance the 
existing infrastructure to take effect. For instance, increasing the supply of pharmaceuticals required an 
open bidding process that took 6–8 months to complete. Similar arguments surely apply to building and 
accrediting new medical facilities, and to training additional personnel. Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
access to health care and the quality thereof improved significantly relative to control group.16 
In order to assess the effect of SP on households’ medical expenditures and utilization of services, a 
follow-up survey successfully re-interviewed 29,897 of the original households during July and August 
2006, i.e. approximately 10 months after random assignment. 
Table 2 displays individuals’ insurance status by experimental assignment and period. The last 
column shows difference-in-differences estimates (and their standard errors) for each health insurance 
option. As intended, treatment significantly increased the share of ‘insured’ individuals relative to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Information on household characteristics and medical expenditures was elicited from the ‘household informant’, 
whereas all individual level information pertains to a household member randomly selected with a Kish table. 
16 After the intervention 69.1% of respondents in the treatment group report being satisfied with the services of their health 
care provider. The corresponding value for the control group is 68.9%. 
	   7	  
control group, in particular the share of SP affiliates. The estimates in Table 2 also suggest a lack of 
substitution effects⎯possibly due to the short duration after treatment. That is, there is no evidence that a 
significant number of previously insured individuals left their provider and affiliated with SP instead. 
The fact that the Seguro Popular Assessment induced experimental variation in health insurance 
coverage among the poor, coupled with rich pre-period information makes it ideally suited for studying 
selection and ex ante moral hazard. 
 
III. Selection and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Experimental Estimates 
A. Selection on Observables 
In particular, the Seguro Popular Experiment admits an unusually clean test for systematic sorting. Since 
SP draws almost exclusively from the pool of uninsured individuals and the data contain health status and 
out-of-pocket medical expenditures prior to the intervention, it is not necessary to rely on the commonly 
used ‘positive correlation test’ (Chiappori and Salanié 2000). Instead of inferring (the absence of) 
selection from the contemporaneous correlation between insurance status and realized expenditures 
(which, as is well known, does not rule out moral hazard), the Seguro Popular Experiment allows to test 
for selection on riskiness by relating insurance take up in the post-period to a proxy for an individual’s 
inherent risk collected in the pre-period. Intuitively, if selection were important, one would expect a 
disproportionate number of ‘high risk’ agents to affiliate with SP as it is being rolled out. While it is, of 
course, important to know whether the insured are on average more risky than the uninsured, a clean test 
of the theory requires isolating the causal effect of an individual’s risk type. Moreover, knowledge of the 
causal effect (as opposed to the mere presence) of selection allows an assessment of whether it is 
quantitatively important. 
To this end, consider the following empirical framework: 
(1) ℎ!,! = ! + !!!,!!! + !!"#$!%#&!!,! + !!"#$!%#&!!,!!!,!!! + !!,!!!′! + !!,!, 
where !"#$!%#&!!,! indicates whether individual ! has received treatment at time !, !!,!!! is a pre-
treatment proxy for !’s inherent ‘riskiness’, and ℎ!,! denotes her health insurance status in the post-
period.17 !!,!!! is a vector of baseline controls containing: gender, age, educational achievement, total 
household expenditures, a proxy for asset holdings, the number of doctors and nurses in the area, as well 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 That is, ℎ!,! is equal to one if ! is covered by any health insurance at the time of the follow-up survey and zero otherwise. 
An alternative specification would have been to set ℎ!,! equal to one only if ! is affiliated with SP, thereby grouping 
uninsured individuals and those with formal sector insurance together. Since the paper is interested in testing the 
predictions of economic theory in this mostly poor and overwhelmingly rural environment, and given that from an 
economic point of view SP and mandatory health insurance are much more alike than ‘formal sector insurance’ and ‘no 
insurance’, this paper groups ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ individuals together. It may be comforting to know, however, that 
the results are qualitatively robust to this modeling choice, which may not be too surprising given the fact that the 
intervention introduces hardly any variation in mandatory insurance membership (cf. Table 2). 
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as indicator variables for whether the household participates in Oportunidades, whether it is located in an 
urban area, and whether individual ! belongs to Mexico’s indigenous population. Covariates are included 
to improve precision and to account for chance differences between treatment and control group. 
Note that !!"# identifies differences in treatment effects between individuals of different risk types. 
In the context of the Seguro Popular Experiment, the least squares estimate of ! indicates whether ‘high 
risk’ individuals are more likely than their ‘low risk’ counterparts to obtain health insurance coverage as it 
becomes available (independent of other unobserved characteristics). Hence, one can reject the null 
hypothesis of no selection on !!,!!! if !!"# is positive (or negative) and statistically significant.18 
Tables 3 and 4 display estimates of specification (1) using different pre-period proxies for agents’ 
inherent ‘riskiness’: self-assessed well-being, and a set of objective measures of health. The rational 
underlying the choice of these proxies is that agents in poor health before the introduction of SP are also 
more likely to incur adverse health shocks afterwards, and can therefore be considered ‘more risky’. 
The right column of Table 3 shows that individuals who assessed their own health as ‘good or very 
good’ on the baseline survey are 5.5 and 6.9 percentage points less likely to be induced to take up health 
insurance than their counterparts in ‘fair’ and ‘bad or very bad’ health, respectively. These estimates are 
large in a real world sense, and they are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Yet, as shown in the column on the left, the raw correlation between health insurance status in the 
post-period and pre-period health assessments is negative. That is, individuals who rated themselves as 
healthier, or who did not incur medical expenditures have a higher propensity to be covered by health 
insurance after the introduction of SP. In principle this could be due to multiple dimensions of private 
information resulting in net advantageous selection (as documented for different markets by Finkelstein 
and McGarry 2006, and Fang et al. 2008). 
Contrary to the findings of Fang et al. (2008), however, there is no evidence for advantageous 
selection on education into SP (see Appendix B). Yet, an equally likely explanation in this context may be 
reverse causality, i.e. healthy individuals might have been more likely to have had health insurance at 
baseline (for instance, because they are more likely to work in the formal sector of the economy) and 
continue to do so in the post-period. In fact, when excluding individuals who were covered by health 
insurance in the pre-period, the coefficients on !!,!!! in Table 3 become very close to zero and  are not 
statistically significant (not reported here). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For a formal proof that ! in equation (1) is well identified in the sense that !"#$  !!"# = ! see Appendix A. Also note 
that despite the inclusion of !!,!!!, the error term !!,! is almost certainly not orthogonal to !!,!!!. For instance, risk 
aversion and an individual’s ‘risk type’ might not only be correlated with insurance status, but also with each other. 
Therefore, !!"# is not well identified, and depending on the correlation between !!,! and !!,!!!, a naïve test of whether 
‘high risk’ agents are more likely to be insured might produce both Type I and Type II errors. Put differently, since !!"# is 
not well identified, levels of insurance uptake are not useful in gauging the extent of selection. Differences in levels, 
however, are identified and may be used to draw inferences about systematic sorting. 
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Curiously, there is also no indication of selection on objective measures of health. Table 4 reports 
estimates of (1) proxying for agents’ riskiness with indicator variables for whether their BMI, cholesterol, 
blood pressure, or glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c)—a criterion for the diagnosis of diabetes—were within 
their respective ‘normal’ ranges when measured at the time of the baseline survey.19 Not only are the 
estimates of ! in Table 4 not statistically significant and (with one exception) much smaller in magnitude 
than their counterparts in Table 3, but three of them also carry the ‘wrong’ sign. 
It therefore appears that agents in the Seguro Popular Experiment sort on subjective health 
assessments, but not on objective ones. One, admittedly unsatisfying, explanation is that the poor might 
not be fully aware of having elevated levels of cholesterol or HbA1c, whereas they are mindful of ‘how 
they feel’. In such a world only the latter factor would be used in deciding whether or not to sign up for 
SP, i.e. obtain health insurance coverage. In line with this hypothesis is the fact that BMI, blood pressure, 
cholesterol, and HbA1c explain less than 1% of the variation in self-assessed health, and that King et al. 
(2007) report individuals in the experiment viewed the medical tests as incentive to participate in the 
survey. However, the evidence in favor of this explanation is only circumstantial.20 
 
B. Ex Ante Moral Hazard 
Apart from adverse selection the theory of asymmetric information also predicts insurance coverage to 
crowd out self-protection (cf. Ehrlich and Becker 1972, Pauly 1974). Unfortunately, pure measures of 
self-protection are rarely available, and the Seguro Popular Experiment is no exception. However, the 
data do contain information on utilization of preventative medical care, i.e. whether an individual had a 
flu shot, pelvic exam, pap smear, mammogram, or had her eyes checked within the last year. Despite the 
fact that the full cost of these services decrease with coverage, the insured might still reduce their demand 
for prevention if ex ante moral hazard is severe enough. Thus, relating insurance status to the utilization 
of preventive services provides a very strong one-sided test for the presence of ex ante moral hazard.21 
However, with different imperfect measures of self-protection at hand it is important to efficiently 
aggregate the available information in order to avoid the multiple inference problem and to improve 
statistical power to detect effects that go in the same direction. One appealing and particularly simple 
approach is to calculate average standardized treatment effects (ASTE). E.g. for some set of parameter 
estimates {!!} define 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The ranges considered ‘normal’ for the purposes of this paper are: 18.5 to 25 kg/m2 for BMI, less than 120 mmHg for 
systolic blood pressure, less than 200 mg/dL for cholesterol, and less than 6% for HbA1c (see WHO 2000, and NIH 1998, 
2002, 2004).  
20 Empirically, self-assessed health is a somewhat better predictor of future health care expenditures than BMI, blood 
pressure, cholesterol, and HbA1c together. However, the explained share of variation is in both cases very low. 
21 It is important to point out that King et al. (2009a) do analyze the utilization of preventive care, but do not make the 
connection between utilization of preventive services and ex ante moral hazard and do not account for the problem of 
multiple inference. 
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(2) !"#$ ≡ !|!| !!!!!∈! , 
where ! denotes the set of available measures, and !! is the standard deviation of outcome !!,!,! in the 
control group. 
To see why calculating ASTEs alleviates the problem of multiple inference note that the ASTE 
provides a unidimensional measure of the effect of treatment on self-protection. By aggregating 
information in this way there remains only one hypothesis to be tested, i.e. whether !"#$ is statistically 
different from zero. Moreover, aggregating information (within similar domains) improves efficiency by 
smoothing out noise.22 
In calculating standard errors one needs to account for the covariance structure of the individual 
point estimates, i.e. {!!}. In order to also cluster on the level of randomization, thus correcting for the 
correlation of outcomes of individuals within the same health clusters, this paper uses the block bootstrap 
with 1,000 iterations. That is, standard errors are obtained by repeatedly resampling health clusters from 
the original data (with replacement), estimating !"#$, and calculating the standard deviation of the 
resulting estimates (see Horowitz 2001 for additional details on the bootstrap). 
Notice, to make effect sizes comparable !"#$ standardizes each coefficient. Also, in contrast to 
other means of aggregating information which produce an index-like measure for each individual, i.e. 
factor or principal component analysis, calculating standardized treatment effects does not require valid 
information on all outcomes for a given observation (or imputation thereof). In the present context this is 
particularly attractive, since three measures of self-protection are only relevant to females, i.e. pelvic 
exams, pap smears, and mammograms. 
Of course, testing for ex ante moral hazard requires estimates of the causal effect of insurance 
coverage. Since coverage is almost certainly endogenous, ordinary least squares estimates are likely 
biased. However, as the intervention induced a considerable fraction of the affected population to select 
into SP, i.e. acquire insurance coverage, one would expect treatment assignment itself to have an impact 
on the demand for preventive care—if there is a causal effect. 
The intent-to-treat (ITT) effect, denoted by !! in equation (3), captures this simple intuition. 
(3) !!,!,! = ! + !!!"#$!%#&!!,! + !!,!!!! ! + !!,!. 
Here ! indexes the set of preventive activities listed above, and !!,!,! is an indicator variable for whether 
individual ! engages in !. Therefore, each !! indicates by how much the treatment group mean changes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I am grateful to Amy Finkelstein for suggesting this approach. Note that it is very similar to the one used by Kling et al. 
(2007) in evaluating the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Experiment. Kling et al. (2007) first standardize each outcome 
variable and then regress the average standardized outcome on treatment assignment. For a discussion of this approach and 
the one used in this paper see the appendix to Kling et al. (2007). 
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relative to that of the control group; and the standardized treatment effect expresses the average change 
over all measures in standard deviation units. Naturally, negative values point towards ex ante moral 
hazard. 
In addition to the effect of treatment on the aggregate demand for preventive care, the causal impact 
of insurance coverage itself is of interest as well. Using an individual’s experimental assignment as 
instrumental variable (IV), this effect can be estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS)—treating 
whether an agent is insured as endogenous and the variables included in !!,!!!   as exogenous. The 
particular model is given by 
(4) !!,!,! = ! + !!ℎ!,! + !!,!!!! ! + !!,! 
and the corresponding first stage 
(5) ℎ!,! = ! + !!"#$!%#&!!,!   + !!,!!!! ! + !!,!. 
All symbols are as defined above.  
If there is heterogeneity in the effect of coverage on the demand for preventive services, as seems 
likely, then !! should be interpreted as local average treatment effect (LATE), i.e. as the change in 
utilization for individuals who enroll in SP, but would have been uninsured had it not been rolled out in 
their area (Imbens and Angrist 1994).23 
Table 5 presents estimates of the relationship between insurance coverage and utilization of 
preventive care. The top row displays average standardized effects. Estimates for each individual measure 
of self-protection are shown below. The left column contains naïve ordinary least squares (OLS) 
coefficients, whereas the middle and right column correspond to ITT and LATE estimates (i.e. ! and !), 
respectively.24 
Strikingly, the standardized effect estimated by OLS is positive, statistically significant, and 
relatively large. On average, insured individuals demand more preventive care. By contrast, the average 
standardized ITT and LATE coefficients are negative, statistically (marginally) significant (! = .050 and ! = .056, respectively), and in the latter case about the same magnitude as the one estimated by OLS. 
That is, the causal effect of insurance goes in the opposite direction. Health insurance coverage induced 
individuals in the Seguro Popular Experiment to engage in less self-protection, indicating the existence of 
ex ante moral hazard. 
Taken at face value the point estimates for individual measures of self-protection support the 
conclusion drawn above. Every single ITT and LATE estimate is negative, although none of them is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Since the endogenous variable is health insurance status and there are “always takers” in the terminology of Angrist, 
Imbens, and Rubin (1996), !! should not be interpreted as the effect of treatment-on-the-treated (TOT). 
24 When appropriate the sample has been limited to females. 
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statistically significant by itself. However, compared to dependent variable sample means between 5.6% 
and 29.2% the point estimates (ranging from .8 to 8.1 percentage points) are economically very large. 
Since insurance coverage reduces the full-cost of obtaining preventive medical care, these estimates 
likely understate the true extent of ex ante moral hazard. That is, holding prices equal, one might expect 
self-protection to decline even more.25  
Readers familiar with the original evaluation of the Seguro Popular Experiment might recall that 
King et al. (2009a) report no change in the utilization of preventative care. It is therefore useful to point 
out why this paper draws the opposite conclusion. Comparing the results of Table 3 in King et al. (2009a) 
with those presented in the lower panel of Table 5 in this paper shows that the ITT estimates for 
individual outcomes are generally very similar. Those with respect to mammograms and eye exams are 
almost identical, and none of the other point estimates differs by more than .007 (relative to a standard 
error of .021). The LATE estimates reported in this paper, however, are slightly larger in magnitude than 
those in King et al. (2009a). The difference between both sets of estimates ranges from .001 to .023 
(compared to standard errors between .016 and .057). These differences narrow by about one half, or even 
reverse, when disregarding the control variables used in this paper. The remainder of the difference 
between the estimates in both papers is due to the fat that King et al.’s (2009a) coding of ℎ!,! considers 
only SP affiliates ‘insured’, whereas this paper is primarily interested in testing the predictions of 
economic theory and thus also includes all other insured individuals. 
However, it is important to note that the difference in interpretation is not an artifact of discrepancies 
in individual point estimates. All of King et al.’s (2009a) estimates carry the expected sign, i.e. are 
negative, and are economically very large—between 6% and 18% of the base level. But they are 
estimated imprecisely. The difference in interpretation between King et al. (2009a) and this paper arises 
because this paper properly accounts for the testing of multiple hypotheses, i.e. the multiple inference 
problem. Aggregating information by calculating ASTEs (or z-scores as in Kling et al. 2007, cf. Table 8) 
avoids the problem of multiple inference and improves statistical power to detect effects that go in the 
same direction. This estimation strategy provides the econometrician with enough power to reject the null 
of no change in utilization, and therefore the null of no ex ante moral hazard (for more precise estimates 
relying on z-scores see Table 8 in the following subsection). 
 
C. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The data contain three more self-reported variables which could potentially proxy for self-protection, i.e. how frequently 
the respondent smokes, drinks alcohol, and how often she wears a seatbelt. However, self-reported levels of these 
activities are implausibly low, and factor analysis reveals that these variables do not load on the same factor as all the other 
proxies used in this paper. It is thus a priori doubtful as to whether these variables are indeed reliable measures of self-
protection. Yet, in the interest of full disclosure it ought to be pointed out that the effect of SP on these measures is very 
small and in no case statistically different from zero. 
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As noted before, one potential concern with the results presented so far is that they could be due to chance 
differences between the treatment and control group. In fact, at baseline individuals in the treatment group 
were more likely to have had a mammogram, and were more frequently already covered by health 
insurance (cf. Table 1). While the former difference would work against detecting a reduction in 
preventive care, pre-existing disparities in insurance status are potentially more troubling. Therefore, this 
section performs a variety of sensitivity checks to demonstrate that the results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively robust. 
Table 6 probes the sensitivity of the findings with respect to selection into health insurance. The left 
panel displays results from linear probability models, whereas the right panel accounts for the binary 
nature of the dependent variable by estimating probit specifications. Entries correspond to ! in equation 
(1), or the associated average marginal effects, for all six pre-period proxies of individuals’ ‘riskiness’. 
The rightmost column within each set shows point estimates controlling for the set of baseline controls as 
well as for health insurance status in the pre-period, and the middle column contains estimates without 
any covariates. For comparison, the coefficients obtained by controlling for !!,!!!  only, i.e. those 
analogous to the ones in Tables 3 and 4, are shown in the leftmost column. While there do exist 
differences, it appears that ! does not depend overly much on the mode of estimation or the set of 
covariates. That is estimated average marginal effects are very similar to their OLS counterparts.26 
Controlling only for !!,!!!, Table 7 shows least squares estimates of ! for different subsamples of 
the data. With two exceptions all coefficients carry the expected sign, i.e. are positive, when pre-period 
health expenditures are used to proxy for risk. Although the point estimates are not very precise, most 
coefficients are of roughly similar magnitude suggesting that the results are not driven by one particular 
group of individuals. With 19 out of 56 entries being negative when objective health indicators are used 
to proxy for risk, there is again no clear indication of selection along this dimension—as was the case in 
Table 4. 
The sensitivity of the results with respect to ex ante moral hazard is investigated next. Varying the 
set of controls and the amount of data used in the estimation the columns on the left in Table 8 display 
average standardized treatment effects, whereas the columns on the right follow Kling et al.’s (2007) 
evaluation of the Moving to Opportunity Experiment and use z-scores as indices of self-protection.27 The 
upper panel contains estimates from cross-sectional models akin to equations (3) and (4), whereas the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Average marginal effects in Table 6 are calculated following Ai and Norton (2003). Graphical representations of the 
sample distribution of all estimated marginal effects are available from the author upon request. To get a sense of their 
dispersion it may be helpful to know that their sample standard deviation is generally fairly small, e.g., .017 for self-rated 
health, .005 for BMI, and .003 for HbA1c (when using the baseline set of covariates).  
27 The point estimates in Table 8 are similar in magnitude when using factor analysis to calculate indices of self-protection, 
but they are in most cases not statistically significant, or only marginally so, since missing information does not allow 
these indices to be calculated for a large number of individuals. 
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lower panel shows coefficients from panel data models including pre-period observations. Going top to 
bottom within each panel the set of included controls steadily grows. 
All cross-sectional point estimates are reasonably close to one another, and, if anything, increase in 
magnitude after controlling for individuals’ health insurance status and the outcome in the pre-period—
independently of whether one calculates ASTEs or z-scores (which are somewhat more precisely 
estimated than the ASTEs). To a lesser extent this also holds for the entries in the lower panel. After 
controlling for time specific factors common to all individuals by including period fixed effects, the panel 
data estimates are very similar to their cross-sectional counterparts. It ought to be noted though that 
including individual fixed effects reduces the ITT and LATE point estimates somewhat, and renders them 
statistically insignificant. However, they continue to be quite large in an economic sense. It is not entirely 
clear whether the reduction in the estimates is due to a lack in residual variation—as evidenced by a 
substantial increase in the standard error—or to true underlying differences between the treatment and 
control group. The fact that the cross-sectional estimates increase after controlling for pre-period 
outcomes and insurance status suggests that loss in precision might be important. 
Average standardized treatment effects for various subsamples of the data are shown in Table 9. In 
almost all cases do the coefficients carry the expected sign and are of similar magnitude as in Table 5. 
While large standard errors prevent sharp conclusions, there is some suggestive evidence that ex ante 
moral hazard is stronger among females.28 
Broadly summarizing, the sensitivity analysis in this subsection suggests that the main results of this 
paper are qualitatively quite robust. This may help to alleviate concerns about chance differences between 
the treatment and control group. 
 
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Although one ought to be cautious not to overemphasize results from the very specific population studied 
in this paper, the findings presented above generally confirm the predictions of economic theory and have 
implications for public policy. 
As has been shown by Fang et al. (2008) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for different markets, 
despite a negative correlation between agents’ ‘riskiness’ and their choice of insurance coverage, ceteris 
paribus individuals do sort based on risk. The crucial question for public policy, however, is whether 
agents are on average adversely or advantageously selected. This paper does not find a source of 
offsetting advantageous selection; and there remains the possibility that what appears as advantageous 
selection in the raw data may be due to reverse causality. That is, ‘low risk’ agents may be more likely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The larger point estimates for females are not an artifact from changing the set of outcomes. The coefficients are very 
similar when restricting attention to Flu Shot and Eye Exam only. 
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work in the formal sector of the Mexican economy, and, therefore, be required to have health insurance. 
While an insurance mandate for formal sector workers limits the possible extent of selection, this does not 
imply that risk based sorting will not be important when it comes to voluntary programs such as SP. On 
one hand this may be welcome—recall that SP was extended to eliminate catastrophic health expenditures 
among the poor. On the other hand, however, if selection is quantitatively important it needs to be taken 
into account when assessing the costs (and benefits) of such programs, in particular in cases in which 
these are designed to be self-sustaining. 
The results presented in this paper also point to the existence of ex ante moral hazard, which 
manifests itself through a reduction in the utilization of preventative care. However, this finding rests on 
two important assumptions: (i) changes in utilization reflect only demand side changes as opposed to 
supply side constraints, and (ii) previous levels of preventive care were not inefficiently high. 
Given the short evaluation horizon in the SP experiment of only 10 months and the fact that building 
new medical facilities and accrediting new staff took likely much longer than that, the supply of medical 
care should been relatively stable. If anything it would appear that the inflow of additional resources 
caused the production possibility frontier to shift outwards, which implies more and higher quality 
options for patients in the treatment group compared to those in the control group. If this in indeed the 
case, then the results in Table 5 will likely not be due to supply side constraints (as these should be less 
severe in the treatment group), and may even understate the true extent of moral hazard. 
Although it is notoriously difficult to determine the optimal level of preventive care, it seems 
implausible that the mostly rural and overwhelmingly poor population in the SP Experiment received 
excessive care. In fact, the summary statistics in Table 1 show rather low levels of utilization. For 
instance, only 5.6% of women received a mammogram, and only 18.5% of individuals had a flu shot. 
Taking the results with respect to moral hazard at face value, they have potentially important policy 
unlikely. In the presence of ex ante moral hazard the welfare consequences of health insurance mandates 
are theoretically ambiguous, even if agents are adversely selected. Furthermore, optimal insurance 
contracts will not only trade off risk sharing and ex post moral hazard through co-payments, but would 
also need to provide appropriate incentives to engage in self-protection. Naturally, the effectiveness of the 
latter depends crucially on the ability of the insurer to observe precautionary activities. But at the same 
time, self-protection shares many features with the classic multi-tasking problem (Holmström and 
Milgrom 1991). This means that the optimal incentive scheme is far from obvious, as it will also depend 
on the substitutability of various precautionary activities, whether any of them carry externalities—as, for 
example, flu shots do—and on how much any reduction in self-protection increases ex post cost. 
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that optimal insurance contracts would either incentivize preventative 
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care through lower co-payments, or even penalties. The exact nature of the optimal incentive provision, 
however, is left for future research. 
* * * 
Ever since the seminal contributions of Arrow (1963), Akerlof (1970) as well as Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1976) have economists been keenly aware of the possibility of market failure due to asymmetric 
information. Yet, empirical evidence in favor of these models has been mixed and often not been able to 
separate moral hazard from selection. 
Using data from a large-scale randomized field experiment in Mexico, this paper exploits 
experimental variation in the availability of health insurance to document systematic sorting based on risk, 
holding all else equal. Moreover, the evidence presented above suggests the existence of non-negligible 
ex ante moral hazard; thereby adding to the sparse empirical evidence on the impact of insurance 
coverage on self-protection. 
 
A. Technical Appendix 
CLAIM: Consider the data generating process 
 ℎ! = !! + !!!! + !!!! + !!!!!! + !! . 
If !! is independently distributed of (!! , !!) and the usual full rank condition is satisfied, then the ordinary 
least squares estimate of !! is well identified. That is, !"#$  !!"# = !!.  
 
PROOF: The Frisch-Waugh Theorem (Frisch and Waugh 1933) implies that (A. 1)        !"#$  !!"# = !! + !"#(!!!!, !!)!"#(!!!!) ,  
where !!!! denotes the residual from projecting !!!! onto the vector 1 !! !! . With (A.1) in hand, it 
suffices to show that  !"# !!!!, !! = 0. 
From the definition of !!!! and using the Frisch-Waugh Theorem again one obtains: 
 !"# !!!!, !! = !"# !!!! − ! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! !! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! !! , !!  
 = !"# !! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! !! , !! ,  where  ! = ! !!!! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! ! !! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! ! !! ,   and  !!   (!! )   corresponds   to   the   residual  form  projecting  !!   (!!) onto !! (!!) and a constant. 
By applying the definition of the covariance and the Law of Iterated Expectations it follows that 
 !"# !! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! !! , !! = ! !! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! !!!! − ! !! − !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! !! ! !!  
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      =    ![!!] − !!" !!!!,!!!"# !! ! !!!! ,  since  !!   is  independent  of  (!! , !!)  and  ! !! = 0.  
Note that as !! is independent of !!, !! simply corresponds to the deviation of !! from its mean. 
Consequently, 
 !"# !!!!,!!!"# !! = !"#(!!!!,!!)!"#(!!) = ! !!!!! !! !!!! ! !!!"#(!!) = ! !! ! !!! !! !! !!"#(!!) = ! !! . 
This shows that !"# !!!!, !! = 0, as desired. ∎ 
 
B. Selection on Educational Attainment and Pre-Period Health Expenditures 
Given that Fang et al. (2008) report offsetting advantageous selection on education and cognitive 
ability in the Medigap market, it may be of interest to estimate the causal effect of education on insurance 
coverage in the Seguro Popular experiment. To this end Table B.1 shows estimates of specification (1) 
replacing !!,!!! with indicator variables for agents’ educational achievement. As in Fang et al. (2008), 
more educated agents are on average more likely to be insured. The causal effect of education on 
insurance uptake, however, is negative and estimated to be very large—at least in the context of SP.29 
The bottom panel of Table B.1 investigates selection on pre-period health expenditures. Compared 
to their counterparts who did not incur any out-of-pocket cost in the month preceding the baseline survey, 
the treatment effect is 3.6 percentage points larger for individuals with positive medical expenditures.30 
Although the least squares coefficient is non-negligible in an economic sense, it is not statistically 
significant. When controlling for pre-period health-insurance status, however, the estimate increases to 
4.1 percentage points and becomes marginally significant (not reported). Hence, there is some suggestive 
evidence that agents sort into SP based on pre-period health expenditures. 
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Data Appendix to 
“Moral Hazard and Selection Among the Poor: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment” 
 
All data used in this paper stem from the Seguro Popular Assessment by King et al. (2007, 2009a, 2009b). 
This appendix provides a description of the key variables used in the analysis. For a detailed description 
of the experimental design beyond that in Section II.B the interested reader should consult King et al. 
(2007, 2009a). 
 
A. Outcome Variables 
Health Insurance is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the first section of the household survey) the 
survey respondent is reported to be covered by any health insurance, and zero otherwise. The variable is 
available on for pre- and post-period. 
BMI is defined as the respondent’s weight (in kilograms) over her squared height (in meters). Weight and 
height were both elicited together with other socio-demographic characteristics during the pre- and post-
period household surveys. A person’s BMI is said to be outside its normal range if it exceeds 25 kg/m2 or 
is lower than 18 kg/m2 (cf. NIH 1998, WHO 2000). 
Blood Pressure is the mean of two systolic blood pressure measurements conducted at the beginning and 
at the end of the household survey, respectively. A person’s systolic blood pressure is defined to be 
outside its normal range if it exceeds 120 mmHg (cf. NIH 2004). The variable is available for the pre- and 
post-period. 
Cholesterol is a respondent’s cholesterol level in mg/dL, as measured at the end of the household survey. 
A person’s cholesterol is defined to be outside its normal range if it exceeds 200 mg/dL (cf. NIH 2002). 
The variable is available for the pre- and post-period. 
HbA1c is a respondent’s level of glycated hemoglobin (in percent), as measured at the end of the 
household survey. HbA1c is an indicator of blood sugar levels over the last couple of months, and thus 
often used in the diagnosis of diabetes. A person’s HbA1c level is defined to be outside its normal range 
if it exceeds 6% (cf. NIH 1998). The variable is available for the pre- and post-period. 
Flu Shot is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the household survey) the respondent reports to have 
been vaccinated against the flu within the last 12 months, and zero otherwise. The variable is available for 
the pre- and post-period. 
Pelvic Exam is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the household survey) the respondent reports to 
have had a pelvic examination within the last 12 months, and zero otherwise. The variable is available for 
the pre- and post-period, but only for females. 
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Pap Smear is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the household survey) the respondent reports to 
have had a pap smear test within the last 12 months, and zero otherwise. The variable is available for the 
pre- and post-period, but only for females. 
Mammogram is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the household survey) the respondent reports to 
have had a mammography within the last 12 months, and zero otherwise. The variable is available for the 
pre- and post-period, but only for females. 
Eye Exam is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the household survey) the respondent reports to 
have had her eyes examined by a health care professional within the last 12 months, and zero otherwise. 
The variable is available for the pre- and post-period. 
 
B. Independent Variables 
Self-Assessed Health corresponds to a respondent’s answer to the question “In general, how would you 
rate your health today?” The set of possible answers consisted of: “very good”, “good”, “fair”, “bad”, 
“very bad”. This paper combines the first two and the last two answer choices, respectively, to form a set 
of three indicator variables. These variables are available for the pre- and post-period. 
Health Expenditures is defined as the household’s expenditures on “health care costs, excluding travel 
expenses related to seeking health care and any reimbursement of health insurance” (in pesos) during the 
last month. The variable is available on for pre- and post-period. 
Gender is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is female, and zero otherwise. 
Age is the respondent’s age (in years), as indicated on the household survey. 
Educational Achievement encompasses five indicator variables capturing the respondent’s formal 
education, as reported on the post-period household survey. The categories considered in this paper are: 
‘less than primary school’, ‘primary school’, ‘completed middle school’, ‘completed high school’, and ‘at 
least some post-secondary education’. The first two serve as omitted category in all regressions that 
include covariates. 
Total Household Expenditures is defined as the household’s total expenditures (in pesos) during the last 
month. This variable is available for the pre- and post-period. 
High Asset Holdings is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the household has at least half of 
the following ‘items’, and zero otherwise: a cement or tile floor, electricity, a washing machine, a gas 
stove, a refrigerator, a phone, a TV set, a computer, or a second home. This variable has been created by 
King et al. (2009a), and is available on the pre- and post-period period. 
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Number of Doctors gives the number of doctors in a particular health cluster prior to the intervention. 
Number of Nurses gives the number of nurses in a particular health cluster prior to the intervention. 
Oportunidades is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent’s household participated in the 
Opotunidades anti-poverty program, and zero otherwise. The variable is available on the pre- and post-
period survey. Opotunidades has formerly been known as Progresa.  
Urban is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent’s household is located in an urban health 
cluster, and zero otherwise. 
Indigenous is an indicator variable equal to one if (on the pre-period household survey) the respondent 
reports speaking one of Mexico’s indigenous languages or dialects, and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 1: Location of Treatment and Control Clusters
p-value
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Treatment = Control
Demographics:
Female .620 (.485) .627 (.483) .613 (.487) .21
Age 42.24 (16.75) 42.36 (16.72) 42.13 (16.78) .69
Indigenous .060 (.236) .064 (.244) .057 (.231) .82
Urban .106 (.308) .109 (.312) .103 (.303) .92
Oportunidades .451 (.498) .458 (.498) .445 (.497) .81
Education:
Less than Primary School .446 (.497) .442 (.497) .451 (.498) .76
Primary School School .246 (.430) .239 (.427) .252 (.434) .27
Incomplete Secondary School .193 (.395) .195 (.396) .191 (.393) .76
Seondary School .049 (.216) .051 (.219) .048 (.213) .76
Post-Secondary Schooling .066 (.248) .073 (.261) .059 (.235) .33
Household Characteristics:
Household Size 4.085 (2.201) 4.132 (2.232) 4.039 (2.169) .33
High Asset Household .546 (.498) .558 (.497) .535 (.499) .63
Annualized Household Expenditures 36,159 (46,047) 37,035 (45,803) 35,283 (46,986) .54
Annualized Expenditures on Health Care 1,483 (6,303) 1,492 (6,115) 1,473 (6,487) .92
Health Insurance Status:
Any Health Insurance .218 (.413) .255 (.436) .181 (.385) .05
Obligatory Health Insurance .154 (.361) .167 (.373) .140 (.347) .35
Voluntary Health Insurance .070 (.255) .093 (.290) .047 (.213) .07
Self-Rated Health:
Very Good or Good .573 (.495) .583 (.493) .564 (.496) .35
Fair .371 (.483) .364 (.481) .379 (.485) .43
Bad or Very Bad .055 (.228) .053 (.223) .058 (.233) .32
Objective Health Measures:
BMI (kg/m2) 26.03 (5.18) 26.02 (5.04) 26.03 (5.30) .96
Systolic Blood Pressure (mmHg) 125.4 (18.9) 125.6 (19.3) 125.2 (18.6) .49
Cholesterol (mg/dL) 176.1 (27.6) 174.9 (27.3) 177.3 (27.9) .25
HbA1c (%) 6.062 (1.328) 6.100 (1.346) 6.023 (1.307) .25
Preventive Care:
Flu Shot .185 (.388) .174 (.379) .196 (.397) .21
Pelvic Exam .222 (.416) .212 (.409) .233 (.423) .34
Pap Smear .292 (.455) .289 (.453) .295 (.456) .80
Mammogram .056 (.230) .064 (.244) .048 (.214) .04
Eye Exam .108 (.310) .110 (.313) .106 (.307) .65
Other Medical Utilization Within Last Year:
Outpatient Care .518 (.500) .513 (.500) .522 (.499) .67
Hospitalized .069 (.254) .070 (.255) .069 (.254) .95
Medical Staff:
Number of Doctors 1.645 (1.719) 1.597 (1.319) 1.721 (2.040) .67
Number of Nurses 1.581 (2.306) 1.423 (1.360) 1.739 (2.956) .51
Number of Observations
Number of Clusters 100 50 50
Notes: Entries are means and standard deviations of pre-period data for those individuals with non-missing information on insurance status. The 
right column displays p-values from testing the equality of means in the treatment and control group. See the Data Appendix for a precise 
definition of each variable.
Table 1: Pre-Period Summary Statistics
Full Sample Treatment Group Control Group
32,426 16,214 16,212
Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Post-Period Diff-in-Diff
Any Health Insurance: .181 .212 .255 .561 .276
(.023) (.026) (.029) (.026) (.037)
Obligatory Health Insurance: .140 .130 .167 .156 -.001
(.018) (.017) (.022) (.020) (.009)
IMSS .097 .089 .107 .100 .001
(.014) (.012) (.017) (.015) (.007)
IMSSTE .025 .025 .032 .031 -.001
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.003)
PEMEX .000 .000 .000 .001 .000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
SEDENA .002 .001 .001 .002 .001
(.001) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.001)
MARINA .000 .000 .002 .001 -.000
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.001)
Other .015 .013 .025 .022 -.001
(.003) (.003) (.006) (.005) (.002)
Voluntary Health Insurance: .047 .087 .093 .413 .280
(.011) (.021) (.022) (.035) (.035)
Seguro Popular .030 .053 .077 .393 .292
(.011) (.015) (.021) (.035) (.032)
Private .005 .003 .004 .002 .002
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
IMSS voluntarily .005 .003 .003 .003 .002
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Other .008 .029 .009 .014 -.017
(.002) (.012) (.005) (.004) (.014)
Table 2: Health Insurance Status in the Seguro Popular Experiment
Notes: Entries denote the fraction of individuals who report being affiliated with different health insurance options, by treatment 
assignment and period. Standard errors are clustered on the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. The right column 
displays difference-in-differences estimates and the corresponding standard errors. Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive.
Control Group Treatment Group
Self-Rated Health in Pre-Period:
In Fair Health -.013 -.040
(.009) (.013)
In Bad or Very Bad -.041 -.075
(.015) (.022)
Treatment .345 .320
(.035) (.037)
Treatment × In Fair Health .055
(.019)
Treatment × In Bad or Very Bad Health .069
(.031)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .173 .174
Number of Observations 28,247 28,247
Table 3: Selection on Self-Rated Health
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation 
(1) by ordinary least squares with individuals' subjective health assessments 
in the pre-period proxying for risk. The omitted category is 'good or very 
good health'. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered on the 
level of randomization and reported in parentheses. In addition to the 
variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each 
covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the 
precise definition and source of each variable.
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
A. Pre-Period BMI
BMI Within Normal Range -.017 -.020
(.008) (.009)
Treatment .336 .334
(.034) (.033)
Treatment × BMI Within Normal Range .006
(.016)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .168 .168
Number of Observations 19,292 19,292
B. Pre-Period Systolic Blood Pressure
Blood Pressure Within Normal Range -.010 -.018
(.007) (.010)
Treatment .346 .339
(.035) (.035)
Treatment × Blood Pressure Within Normal Range .016
(.014)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .173 .174
Number of Observations 28,092 28,092
C. Pre-Period Cholesterol
Cholesterol Within Normal Range -.005 .003
(.016) (.022)
Treatment .358 .373
(.034) (.043)
Treatment × Cholesterol Within Normal Range -.018
(.032)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .176 .176
Number of Observations 23,217 23,217
D. Pre-Period HbA1c
 HbA1c Within Normal Range .012 -.016
(.014) (.020)
Treatment .365 .331
(.035) (.040)
Treatment × HbA1c Within Normal Range .053
(.029)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .185 .185
Number of Observations 13,398 13,398
Table 4: Selection on Objective Health Measures
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation 
(1) by ordinary least squares with different anthropometric measures of health 
proxying for risk. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered on 
the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. In addition to the 
variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each 
covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data Appendix for the 
precise definition and source of each variable.
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
Pre-Period
OLS ITT LATE
Standardized Effect .145 -.047 -.131
(.022) (.024) (.069)
Witin Last Year:
Flu Shot .073 -.023 -.065
(.012) (.019) (.056)
Pelvic Exam .040 -.020 -.054
(.014) (.021) (.057)
Pap Smear .070 -.030 -.081
(.017) (.020) (.054)
Mammogram .033 -.009 -.024
(.007) (.006) (.016)
Eye Exam .045 -.008 -.024
(.008) (.008) (.024)
 
Table 5: The Impact of Insurance Coverage on Utilization of Preventive Care
Notes: Entries are least squares estimates of the effect of insurance coverage on the 
utilization of preventive care. The left column displays naïve ordinary least squares 
estimates, whereas the columns on the right contain ITT and LATE estimates 
corresponding to ϕ and π in equations (3) and (4), respectively. Average standardized 
treatment effects are reported in the top row, and estimates for each individual 
preventive activity are shown below. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered on 
the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. All regressions contain the 
baseline set of covariates as well as indicator variables for missing values on each 
covariate. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each 
variable.
Post-Period
Self-Rated Health in Pre-Period:
In Fair Health .055 .051 .048 .052 .051 .044
(.019) (.019) (.017) (.019) (.019) (.017)
In Bad or Very Bad Health .069 .060 .055 .054 .058 .043
(.031) (.032) (.025) (.029) (.031) (.024)
Objective Health Indicator Within Normal Range:
Pre-Period BMI .006 .005 .007 .009 .005 .006
(.016) (.017) (.013) (.016) (.017) (.013)
Pre-Period Cholesterol -.018 -.020 -.018 -.018 -.020 -.018
(.032) (.031) (.025) (.025) (.030) (.024)
Pre-Period Systolic Blood Pressure .016 .014 .020 .019 .013 .020
(.014) (.014) (.011) (.014) (.014) (.012)
Pre-Period HbA1c .053 .049 .041 .058 .049 .041
(.029) (.028) (.025) (.028) (.027) (.025)
Baseline Controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Pre-Period Health Insurance Status No No Yes No No Yes
I. Linear Probability Model
Coefficient on Interaction Term
II. Probit
Average Marginal Effect
Notes: Entries denote estimates of γ in equation (1), or the corresponding marginal effects, for various proxies of risk 
and different sets of covariates. Results using linear probability models are shown in the panel on the left, whereas the 
right panel contains average marginal effects estimated from probit models. The leftmost column within each set 
contains estimates analogous to those in Tables 3-6, i.e. controlling only for the baseline covariates. The middle column 
displays coefficients without controlling for any other observables, and the rightmost column controls for health 
insurance status in the pre-period as well as for the baseline covariates. The respective risk proxy is listed on the left of 
each row. Standard errors are clustered on the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. All regressions 
contain indicator variables for missing values on each covariate. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and 
source of each variable.
Table 6: Robustness and Sensitivity of Selection Results
Sample Fair Bad or Very Bad BMI Cholesterol Blood Pressure HbA1c
Full Sample .055 .069 .006 -.018 .016 .053
(.019) (.031) (.016) (.032) (.014) (.029)
By Age:
< 40 .059 .111 -.007 .013 .031 .064
(.022) (047) (.019) (.035) (.017) (.036)
40 to 60 .050 .086 .028 -.048 .012 .068
(.026) (.044) (.030) (.033) (.023) (.035)
> 60 .069 .040 .018 -.020 -.011 .065
(.035) (.049) (.034) (.052) (.036) (.043)
By Gender:
Females .090 .055 -.023 -.061 .000 .041
(.025) (.051) (.023) (.037) (.019) (.035)
Males .032 .061 .028 .006 .007 .056
(.020) (.034) (.020) (.033) (.016) (.031)
By Household Assests:
High Assets .054 .088 -.001 -.010 .007 .061
(.021) (.043) (.021) (.032) (.018) (.028)
Low Assets .051 .025 -.020 -.037 .024 .025
(.030) (.041) (.023) (.041) (.018) (.040)
By Pre-Period Employement Status:
Employed .076 .101 -.013 -.021 .019 .037
(.023) (.043) (.020) (.036) (.018) (.033)
Unemployed .033 .036 .033 -.011 .009 .072
(.022) (.035) (.022) (.034) (.018) (.034)
By Location Type:
Urban -.050 -.070 -.008 .073 -.005 .068
(.044) (.103) (.034) (.055) (.043) (.055)
Rural .051 .064 .003 -.040 .017 .049
(.020) (.032) (.017) (.033) (.013) (.030)
By Number of Doctors in the Area:
Above Median .026 .114 -.005 .041 .028 .028
(.027) (.048) (.025) (.037) (.024) (.035)
Below Median .051 .028 .002 -.032 .012 .045
(.022) (.034) (.019) (.035) (.016) (.034)
Table 7: Selection by Subsample
Notes: Entries denote ordinary least squares of γ in equation (1) for various proxies of risk and different subsamples of the data. The respective 
risk proxy is listed on the top of each column, and the subsample is listed on the left of each row. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
clustered on the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. All regressions contain the baseline set of controls and indicator variables 
for missing values on each covariate. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Self-Rated Health: Health Indicator Within Normal Range:
A. Cross-Sectional Analysis (Post-Period)
I. ASTE II. Z-Scores
Covariates ITT LATE ITT LATE
No Controls -.038 -.103 -.037 -.106
(.025) (.069) (.017) (.051)
Baseline Controls -.047 -.131 -.044 -.128
(.024) (.069) (.016) (.051)
Baseline Controls, Pre-Period Health Insurance -.056 -.174 -.051 -.161
(.024) (.076) (.016) (.056)
Baseline Controls, Pre-Period Health Insurance, -.050 -.152 -.046 -.145
Outcome in Pre-Period (.022) (.071) (.014) (.050)
B. Panel Data Analysis (Pre- & Post-Period)
I. ASTE II. Z-Scores
Covariates ITT LATE ITT LATE
No Controls -.023 -.061 -.034 -.098
(.018) (.048) (.012) (.038)
Period Fixed Effects -.038 -.103 -.037 -.106
(.025) (.069) (.017) (.051)
Period Fixed Effects, Baseline Controls -.047 -.133 -.044 -.130
(.024) (.068) (.016) (.051)
Period Fixed Effects, Individual Fixed Effects -.027 -.095 -.031 -.112
(.028) (.109) (.028) (.071)
Preventive Care
Preventive Care Preventive Care
Preventive Care
Notes: Entries are ITT and LATE estimates of the effect of insurance coverage on the utilization of 
preventive care analogous to ϕ and π in equations (3) and (4), respectively. The columns on the left 
show average standardized treatment effects (cf. equation (2)), and the colums on the right use z-
scores as indices of self-protection (cf. Kling et al. 2007). The top panel presents cross-sectional 
estimates, and the lower one contains coefficients from panel data models using pre- and post-
period observations. The set of controls is denoted on the left of each row. Standard errors are 
clustered on the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. Those for ASTE have been 
calculated using the block-bootstrap with 1,000 iterations. All regressions contain indicator 
variables for missing values on each covariate. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition 
and source of each variable.
Table 8: Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis of the Impact of Health Insurance on Self-Protection
Sample ITT LATE
Full Sample -.047 -.131
(.024) (.069)
By Age:
< 40 -.039 -.109
(.026) (.070)
40 to 60 -.054 -.149
(.025) (.073)
> 60 -.066 -.198
(.036) (.122)
By Gender:
Females -.053 -.145
(.024) (.067)
Males -.012 -.037
(.027) (.098)
By Household Assests:
High Assets -.037 -.121
(.024) (.081)
Low Assets -.065 -.149
(.030) (.081)
By Pre-Period Employement Status:
Employed -.058 -.162
(.026) (.077)
Unemployed -.048 -.129
(.025) (.068)
By Location Type:
Urban -.052 -1.008
(.042) (49.022)
Rural -.048 -.122
(.026) (.068)
By Number of Doctors in the Area:
Above Median -.063 -.189
(.047) (.143)
Below Median -.035 -.087
(.027) (.072)
By Pre-Period Health:
In Very Good or Good Health -.037 -.109
(.027) (.078)
In Fair Health -.057 -.147
(.025) (.070)
In Bad or Very Bad Health -.068 -.164
(.040) (.098)
Preventive Care
Table 9: Average Standardized Treatment Effects by Subsample
Notes: Entries are standardized average treatments effects of 
insurance coverage on the utilization of preventive care in various 
subsamples of the data, i.e. ITT and LATE estimates 
corresponding to ϕ and π in equations (3) and (4), respectively. 
The respective subsample is listed on the left of each row. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered on the level of 
randomization and reported in parentheses. All regressions 
contain indicator variables for missing values on each covariate. 
See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of 
each variable.
A. Educational Attainment
Educational Achievement:
Completed Middle School .040 .082
(.014) (.019)
Completed High School .076 .168
(.023) (.030)
Post-Secondary Schooling .215 .354
(.021) (.031)
Treatment .345 .383
(.035) (.038)
Treatment × Completed Middle School -.084
(.028)
Treatment × Completed High School -.180
(.047)
Treatment × Post-Secondary Schooling -.252
(.047)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .173 .178
Number of Observations 28,221 28,221
B. Health Expenditures
Positive Pre-Period Health Expenditures -.043 -.062
(.013) (.018)
Treatment .345 .336
(.035) (.038)
Treatment × Positive Pre-Period Health Expenditures .036
(.029)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes
R-Squared .173 .173
Number of Observations 28,394 28,394
Table B.1: Selection on Educational Attainment and Health Expenditures
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation 
(1) by ordinary least squares. The omitted category in the upper panel is 
'primary school or less'. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
clustered on the level of randomization and reported in parentheses. In 
addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing 
values on each covariate are also included in the regressions. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Post-Period
Health Insurance Status
